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1. Introduction 
 
n 12 October 2017, a groundbreaking new regulation establishing the 
European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) was adopted by twenty-two 
Member States (MS) of the European Union.1 Those MS are now part of a so-called 
enhanced cooperation (EPPO-EnC2) which targets the establishment of a new and 
genuine legal and judicial joint framework against crimes affecting the financial 
interests of the Union recognizing that it can be better achieved at Union level by 
reason of its scale and effects. The present situation, in which the criminal 
prosecution of offences against the Union’s financial interests is exclusively in the 
hands of the authorities of the MS of the EU, does not always sufficiently achieve 
that objective. The framework of this joint efforts provides for a system of shared 
                                                 
* Intézetvezető egyetemi tanár, Szegedi Tudományegyetem, Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, Bűnügyi 
Tudományok Intézete [Full professor, Head of Unit; University of Szeged, Institute of Criminal Law and 
Criminal Science; Jean Monnet Chair] 
1 The road to this legislative act has been started in the 1990s, about the development see the works of 
the jubilee: FARKAS Ákos: Az EU büntetőjogi korlátai. Ügyészségi Szemle, 2018/2. 7496.; See in 
particular WEYEMBERG, Ann – BRIERE, Chloé: Towards a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (2016. 
European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs) 164.; LÁRIS, 
Liliána: Reasons of the Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office. Iustum Aequum 
Salutare, 13/2017. 219234.; BACHMEIER, Lorena (ed): The European Public Prosecutor's Office. 
Springer, 2018.; GEELHOED, Willem – ERKELENS, Leendert – MEIJ, Arjen (eds): Shifting Perspectives on 
the European Public Prosecutor's Office. Springer, 2018. For basics on EPPO see LIGETI, Katalin: The 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office: How Should the Rules Applicable to its Procedure be Determined. 
EuCLR, 2/2011, 123148.; LIGETI, Katalin (ed): Toward a Prosecutor for the European Union. Volume 
1. Hart Publishing, 2012.; SPENCER, John R.: Who is afraid of the big, bad European Public Prosecutor? 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 14/2012. 363380.; WADE, Marianne: A European 
public prosecutor: potential and pitfalls. Crime, Law and Social Change 59/2013. 439–486.; CSÚRI, 
András: The Proposed European Public Prosecutor’s Office – from a Trojan Horse to a White 
Elephant? Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 18/2016. 122–151.; TRENTMAN, Christian: 
Eurojust und Europäische Staatsanwaltschaft – Auf dem richtigen Weg? Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft, 129/2017. 108145. 
2 O.J. 2017, L 283, Council regulation 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced 
cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’)  
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competence between the EPPO and national authorities in combating crimes 
affecting the financial interests of the Union, based on the right of evocation of the 
EPPO. The EPPO will be granted powers of criminal investigation and prosecution, 
it will be an independent and accountable institution of the Union. EPPO will act in 
the interest of the Union as a whole. The TFEU provides3 that the material scope of 
competence of the EPPO is limited to criminal offences affecting the financial 
interests of the Union. The offences against the financial interests of the EU are 
laid down in the directive on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial 
interests by means of criminal law,4 which defines the relevant offences (fraud, 
corruption, money laundering, misappropriation and other related offences) and 
provides minimum-ruling and calls for implementation in the MS. These offences 
fall within the direct material scope of competence of the EPPO, meanwhile, the 
EPPO-Reg contains rules on supplementary material scope of competence of the 
EPPO as well: the EPPO investigates, prosecutes and brings to judgment the 
perpetrators of any other offences so far as they are inextricably linked to the 
offences against the financial interests of the EU. 
There are some MS remained which are not participating in the enhanced 
cooperation.5 However, I think non-participating MS can be affected heavily by 
enhanced cooperation in this field especially due to the ‘coercive power’ of legal 
integration in connection with the nature of the related offences as being 
transnational. This will make joining the enhanced cooperation on EPPO also for 
them necessary.  
 
 
2. Enhanced Cooperation and its External Effects 
 
Enhanced cooperation6 is a procedure under which a minimum of 9 EU countries 
are allowed to establish advanced integration or cooperation in an area within EU 
structures, but without the involvement of the other EU countries. Other EU 
countries maintain their right to join when they wish to do so. This enables them 
to move at a different pace and towards different goals than those outside of the 
enhanced cooperation areas. The procedure is designed to overcome paralysis, 
                                                 
3 The Lisbon Treaty amended the original treaties, and the Treaty on the European Community was 
transformed into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). TFEU Article 86 
Section 2 „The European Public Prosecutor's Office shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting 
and bringing to judgment, where appropriate in liaison with Europol, the perpetrators of, and 
accomplices in, offences against the Union's financial interests, as determined by the regulation 
provided for in paragraph 1. It shall exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of 
the Member States in relation to such offences.” 
4 O.J. 2017, L 198, Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 
2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law.  
5 Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Spain, Hungary and the UK.  
6 KROLL, Daniela – LEUFFEN, Dirk: Enhanced cooperation in practice. An analysis of differentiated 
integration in EU secondary law. Journal of European Public Policy, 22/2015. 353.; CANTORE, Carlo 
Maria: We're one, but we're not the same: Enhanced Cooperation and the Tension between Unity and 
Asymmetry in the EU. Perspectives on Federalism, 3/2011. 121. 
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where a proposal is blocked by an individual country or a small group of countries 
who do not wish to be part of the initiative. It does not, however, allow for an 
extension of powers outside of those permitted by the EU Treaties. The possibility 
was first introduced by the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty (‘closer cooperation’), with the 
2009 Lisbon Treaty formalizing the procedure and extending the possibility for 
enhanced cooperation to include defence.7 
This procedure was being applied in the fields of divorce law, and patents 
(European Unitary Patent), and is approved for the European Public Prosecutor 
Office, and is presently under negotiations or at final stage of approval for use in 
the field of a financial transaction tax and of property regime rules (of international 
couples). As several initiatives of enhanced cooperation have already been 
approved, which demonstrates huge potential  
“in a period of disillusion with European integration (…). Therefore, the question is 
no longer whether or not the rules on enhanced cooperation are useful. Rather, it 
remains to be properly assessed how far forward they will push European 
asymmetry, whether more asymmetry is desirable and what level of asymmetry is 
sustainable.”8  
Enhanced cooperation provides an opportunity for a certain group of member 
states to deepen integration along EU objectives even if not each and every 
member state wishes to realize the given aim under the given stage of integration 
– neither legal solutions outside of the EU legal framework nor restricting the 
discretion to speed up can be viable options. Obviously, with this, the reality of the 
multispeed Europe has disrobed the negative connotations materializing in 
analyses and political declarations, as the establishment of enhanced cooperation 
legal opportunity is what justifies the varying levels of inclination for integration 
and provides a formal, legally supported framework. 
Article 327 TFEU declares that any enhanced cooperation shall respect the 
competences, rights and obligations of those MS that do not participate in it, but 
also underlines that the non-participating MS shall not impede its implementation 
by the participating Member States. Under TFEU, the new rules on enhanced 
cooperation provide a ‘no veto’ regulatory scheme, which also means that the non-
participating MS no longer (before the Nizza Treaty that was the case) have the 
power to block an initiative and may join the enhanced cooperation at any time. 
However, the MS can only join if it has fulfilled the conditions for participation and 
adopts any transitional measures necessary with regard to the application of the 
acts already adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation (Article 331 
TFEU). This also means that it is the non-participating member state’s primary 
interest to monitor the operation of the enhanced cooperation that was created 
without [the member state] and logically, to make sure that its lack of participation 
                                                 
7 The adoption of the decision authorising enhanced cooperation requires a qualified majority of 
Member States within the Council and the consent of the European Parliament. The adoption of the 
new rules then requires unanimity by the Member States participating in enhanced cooperation and 
the consultation of the European Parliament. The other Member States are free to join the enhanced 
cooperation at any time. 
8 CANTORE: i.m. 14. 
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does not adversely affect its interests. Although the TFEU sets forth that enhanced 
cooperation considers the interests of the non-participants as well, in the event of 
a conflict, the integrity of the interests of the non-participating MS shall be 
surpassed by the general EU integration interests and rules, of course.  
The CJEU stated in its judgement C-274/11 (16. April 2013) in relation with the 
unitary patent enhanced cooperation that  
“it is essential for enhanced cooperation not to lead to the adoption of measures 
that might prevent the non-participating Member States from exercising their 
competences and rights or shouldering their obligations, it is, in contrast, 
permissible for those taking part in this cooperation to prescribe rules with which 
those non-participating States would not agree if they did take part in it. Indeed, 
the prescription of such rules does not render ineffective the opportunity for non-
participating Member States of joining in the enhanced cooperation. As provided by 
the first paragraph of Article 328(1) TFEU, participation is subject to the condition 
of compliance with the acts already adopted by those Member States that have 
taken part in that cooperation since it began.”9  
Therefore, in connection with the establishment of EPPO, one of the most 
important questions to be addressed is handling changes affecting non-
participating MS, as the insignificance of territorial boundaries is especially distinct 
in this area: in particular, it had been the efforts to combat transnational- and 
cross-border crime that had brought the area based on freedom security, and 
justice to life in the first place (obviously, starting based on its history), and that 
the joint efforts of the MS would provide sufficient and effective solutions to 
modern forms of crime. The result of the joint efforts was that criminal prosecution 
and criminal justice operating under the national framework has opened, and many 
such achievements have come to life that have raised the national instruments of 
the judiciary for exercising power to a supranational European- or cooperative level 
between MS. But by comparison, the EPPO enhanced cooperation will actually 
reinstate geographic restrictions – in my opinion, without much luck however, and 
following its commencement, the EPPO enhanced cooperation will give rise to 
effects concerning criminal justice within non-participating MS that could dislodge 
provisions of Article 327.  
Whereas EPPO follows the European territoriality principle within the MS of the 
enhanced cooperation, the same regime would reactivate ‘state borders’ in its 
cooperation with non-participating MS inflating the achievements in area of 
freedom, security and justice. I believe that the external effects of this so-called 
enhanced cooperation will be significant, necessary, and inevitable – and the 
conflicts emerging because of these will presumably only be solvable if all MS enter 
the EPPO system.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Joined cases C 274/11 and C 295/11; ‑ ‑ Spain and Italy against the Council, EU:C:2013:240. 
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3. Mutual recognition rules the discrepancies of implementation 
 
Due to the directive containing the concerned offences, the substantive criminal 
law protection of MS will be uneven after implementing procedures, and there will 
certainly be unique constellations deriving from different legal systems of the MS 
and the minimum regulatory method of the directive, that will generate basic 
differences concerning specific questions, among the most important being 
punishability and impunity. Some examples:  
 the rules on the period of limitation (limitation of liability by the lapse of 
time) of certain MS set the minimum time limits to a later period, while 
others set a different but earlier maximum time limit for punishability;   
 different interpretation of accessory character of the participation could 
result in different judgment of the same aiding or abetting conduct; 
 as a result of the fundamentally different dogmatic approaches related to 
the stages of perpetration, the same act could be considered punishable 
attempt in one MS or perhaps preparation in another depending on the 
acceptance of an objective or a subjective theory;    
 the concrete conditions for sanctionability of legal persons can be 
fundamentally different (is the establishment of a crime by a natural person 
necessary; what causal relationships must be examined, etc.). 
Such regulatory asymmetries are inevitable in this co-working system of 
European law and national criminal law, and only systematic research can provide 
real prognose in this regard.10 However, the main fundamental problem can be 
identified nonetheless, and it is that the limits (or scope) of punishability for the 
given offences do not overlap entirely in the different MS, thus the scope of 
competence on the side of the EPPO will show discrepancies in the different MS 
because only the MS ‘jurisdiction’ on offences turns the competence of EPPO into 
reality.  
It is important to note that disparities in the limits of punishability/non-
punishability in the different MS is not new for the area of freedom, security and 
justice (and for ECL). Actually, the principle of mutual recognition11 is the tool 
dedicated to overcome these differences if necessary. Moreover, there are some 
supporting instruments availing the compensation of differences in the scope of 
punishability by approaching mutual recognition: meanwhile in the system of the 
European arrest warrant, a certain automatism serves for rounding off the 
differences, the principle of assimilation will apply in the regime of European 
investigation order. Mutual recognition plays a role also in the system of EPPO 
(Article 31) but not as it regards the competence rules. The implementation of a 
directive according to a national criminal law system does not provide automatic 
compliance with all other MS criminal law, the risk of a ‘relative gap of 
punishability’ (= not fully overlapping prohibitions by criminal law) cannot be 
                                                 
10 LIGETI: i.m.  
11 See basics and summary in FARKAS Ákos: Az Európai Bíróság és a kölcsönös elismerés elvének hatása 
az európai büntetőjog fejlődésére. Miskolci Jogi Szemle, 2011/6. 6277. 
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eliminated by mutual recognition. That is the trap in this regime. A more focused 
legal unification could provide a rescue route if the political consensus is given in 
this regard. The activist jurisprudence of the CJEU cannot be an option thereto 
because the key issue here is gap of punishability or – from the opposite point of 
view – acceptance of non-punishability. And case law in criminal matters itself 
cannot fill gaps of punishability, it cannot extend or establish criminal responsibility 
if the (written) law does not provide a solid basis for it. However, if we accept that 
EU has been granted partial ius puniendi by the MS regarding the protection of the 
financial interests the CJEU will have the entitlement to apply more activism in this 
regard as well.  
 
 
4. Scope of application 
 
According to Article 23 the EPPO shall be competent for the offences referred to in 
Article 22 where such offences: (a) were committed in whole or in part within the 
territory of one or several Member States; (b) were committed by a national of a 
Member State, provided that a Member State has jurisdiction for such offences 
when committed outside its territory, or (c) were committed outside the territories 
referred to in point (a) by a person who was subject to the Staff Regulations or to 
the Conditions of Employment,12 at the time of the offence, provided that a 
Member State has jurisdiction for such offences when committed outside its 
territory. 
The crimes that the EPPO will have an important role in stepping up against are 
often such that due to their transnational character could be committed within the 
territory of non-participating MS. In the case of carousel fraud or other types of 
VAT fraud acts, for example, that can be committed in the territory of a non-
participating MS and are inextricably linked to similar activities perpetrated in other 
MS that are EPPO participants, the following scenarios could be conceivable.  
Applying Article 23 section a) and b) there are the following initial scenarios: 
 the offence has been committed in at least two participating MS – this is the 
normal case of EPPO, it is a full acceptance of the principle of European 
territoriality.  
 the offence has been committed in at least two MS (one of them is a non-
participating country; 1. and 2.) or 
 the offence has been committed in a participating MS but by a citizen of a 
non-participating MS (3.) or  
 the offence has been committed in a non-participating MS but by a citizen of 
a participating MS (4.).  
It does not fall under the scope of application of the regulation, if the offence 
has been committed only on the territory of non-participating MS by their citizens.  
                                                 
12 O.J. 2013, L 287, Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2013 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union.  
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The second case has two further alternatives (1. and 2. in the graph) according 
to the factual circumstance whether the offence has separable acts committed on 
the territory of a non-participating MS.  
If its separable: EPPO does not deal with the cases committed in non-
participating MS but signals the possible need for a procedure to national law 
enforcement authorities. The domestic authorities will decide whether to proceed, 
however the background directive requires the prosecution, thus a decision not to 
prosecute would constitute a violation of the union law. (1.) 
 
 
 
The EPPO is dealing with an offence which (or at least part of it) has been 
perpetrated in a non-participating MS, and the case cannot be separated, the 
inextricable connection is given. In this case the procedure of the EPPO – in the 
case of a final decision having been reached, will result in res judicata and the ne 
bis in idem doctrine13 will come into force. The negative effect of this will be that 
the ne bis in idem doctrine will also enter into force for the parts of the crime 
committed in the non-participating MS but without participation of this country in 
the adjudication process. The ne bis in idem principle shall prevail even if another 
MS criminal proceeding had been initiated in parallel, and further, if this procedure 
                                                 
13 KARSAI Krisztina: Transnational ne bis in idem principle in the Hungarian Fundamental Law. In: 
Spinellis C. D. and others (eds): Europe in Crisis: Crime, Criminal Justice, and the Way Forward: 
Essays in Honour of Nestor Courakis. Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 2017. 409.  
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was to be closed following substantive examination prior to the procedure initiated 
by EPPO, the res judicata power of the former would make the judgment of EPPO 
redundant. The EPPO is dealing with an offence that (or at least part of it) had 
been perpetrated in a non-participating MS, and the case can be separated. In 
such a case, the competent authorities of this MS shall have a procedural 
obligation (principle of procedural legality) from the point knowledge is gained of 
the possible commission of the offence – at the latest after the EPPO informed the 
competent authorities. Unquestionably, it can be noted that on one hand, the 
above scenarios may give rise to abuse of the system, while on the other hand, 
these may result in the non-punishment of offences committed in the territory of 
non-participating MS. (2.)  
It may also happen that an act is committed by a national of the non-
participating MS abroad, that is, in the territory of a MS that has joined the 
enhanced cooperation scheme. If that MS acknowledges the active personal 
principle (which is generally dominant in any European country), its jurisdiction will 
be extended to the offence, but this will conflict with the jurisdiction of EPPO. In 
this case, as well as in the scope of the former cases, application of the 
coordination mechanism can be recommended, which in its current status covers 
conflicts of jurisdiction between MS but could logically be applicable in MS-EPPO 
relations as well.14 (3.)  
The rules applied for acts committed in the territory of non-participating MS are 
based on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the EPPO. In this scenario, Article 23 no. 
b) of the EPPO-Reg could be applied, such as a situation where under criminal law 
of the participating MS the active personal principle would prevail without limitation 
– in other words, the MS enforces claims for punishment for a criminal act 
committed elsewhere by its national. In such a case, the criminal jurisdiction of 
non-participating MS could exist for an act committed in its territory, but in this 
case the EPPO may also maintain the right of exercising competence. A criminal 
procedure carried out in parallel could also have consequences such as those 
outlined in the former point. If authorities of non-participating MS do not carry out 
a procedure, the principle of non-territorial jurisdiction acknowledged by EPPO-Reg 
would again precipitate that the EPPO may prosecute an act committed in the 
territory of this MS. (4.) 
In summary it can be concluded that between the non-participating MS and the 
EPPO, both negative and positive jurisdictional conflicts will arise and in essence, 
settling these without infringing upon the rule of law principles is at most possible 
only if we sacrifice the effective prosecution of transnational crimes that violate EU 
financial interests. This is not among the possible options even for non-
participating MS, since the provision under Article 328 of the TEU already sets this 
forth as a fundamental obligation for all MS.   
 
 
                                                 
14 O.J. 2009, L 328/42, Council framework decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on prevention 
and settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings.  
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5. Ne bis in idem 
 
The acknowledgement and the enforcement of the transnational validity of the 
classic ne bis in idem principle with the tools of European law is one of the most 
important material achievements of European criminal law. The enforcement of the 
principle bears a significant risk not only for EPPO, but as already mentioned, for 
the non-participating MS as well. When both EPPO and the non-participating MS 
have competence over the act, or a part of it – due to any provision giving ground 
to competence – it may result in starting a ‘competition’ or a ‘race’ for the blocking 
effect by delivering a final decision that can have a negative impact on the well-
foundedness of the decision-making. 
As a further risk, in the cases specified by the law of non-participating MS, the 
criminal procedure can also be carried out against an accused person who 
committed the relevant offence but is absent during the procedure (for instance in 
Hungary this is the case). It may easily result, on the basis of the personal 
principle, in allowing the non-participating MS to proceed as a general rule, and it 
shall indeed proceed, although on the basis of the principle of territoriality the 
offence has been committed in a state that handed over the procedure to EPPO, 
which is therefore also competent to proceed. Due to the principle of ne bis in 
idem, EPPO would only terminate the procedure if there was a final national 
decision, however, in such a case, the binding force upon EPPO of an in-absentia 
decision would still be questionable. In this case, the authorities of non-
participating MS would not be bound to terminate the procedure, nevertheless the 
criminal procedure could possibly be transferred to the MS having jurisdiction 
according to the place of committing the offence. This would naturally imply 
accepting that the transferred criminal procedure shall be completed by EPPO.  
 
 
6. Safe-havens and forum shopping? 
 
Any system allowing the opting out of certain geographic territories from the 
unified territorial competence and allowing for independent decisions to be passed 
in a proceeding with the case by authorities independent from each other, creates 
a fundamental ‘hotbed’ of forum shopping resulting from the collision of 
jurisdictions: it applies both for the prosecutors of crime and the criminals. In 
addition, there can be another layer that can further aggravate such a situation: 
when there are also political reasons behind opting out of EPPO.  
The phenomenon of forum shopping is usually referred to in the context of the 
‘conscious’ conduct of criminals: accordingly, more qualified criminal offenders may 
assess the differences between the provisions of criminal or procedural law when 
they decide on where to commit the offence. They may in particular orient 
themselves along the existence of criminal liability (i.e. whether or not the given 
act is a criminal offence), the gravity of the punishments, the rules on confiscation 
of property (e.g. the reversing of the burden of proof), or according to special 
procedural rules, and the existence or the lack of cooperation in extradition may 
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also be a relevant factor with regard to countries outside Europe. We may assume 
that – if the offender has an option to decide or to make an influence – he shall 
choose the country where he may expect a less severe adjudication or an 
extended (extendable) procedure, should his act still be discovered.  
The factors that formulate forum shopping by prosecutors of crime are factually 
present in traditional interstate cooperation and they serve as concealed or open 
currency for political compromises and deals or as reciprocities between states that 
serve other interests. Between the European states, these manoeuvres have 
already lost their political charge, but concurrently they take force in a concealed 
(informal) way as they nonetheless exist as a consequence of the most important 
achievement of the integration of criminal law in the EU. The transnational 
acknowledgement of the ne bis in idem principle, the obligation of coordinating (at 
least in the beginning) parallel criminal procedures, the supranational EU legal 
basis established for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction all result – in the case of 
certain concrete criminal offences affecting several MS –, in putting the states with 
jurisdiction into a situation of being able to assess and make a decision binding 
upon all MS in the question of which state shall proceed finally with the case. Here 
the difference in the intensity of the evidence available in the different states can 
be a fundamental aspect, but the decision-making matrix shall also include the 
level of threat by punishment, the type of the sanctions and clearly the comparison 
of the procedural rules as well (possibility of pre-trial detention, option to use 
secret or concealed tools etc.). It is evident that the humanist principles of the 
criminal system based on force by the state would not allow choosing a proceeding 
state because it offers the most severe sanctions or as the causes excluding 
criminal liability are narrower there, or indeed because the requirement of the level 
of probability needed for passing an assured judgement as followed in the 
procedure of taking evidence is lower than in other states. 
 In this context, in any case where EPPO would otherwise proceed (in a 
participating country) there is a concrete and constitutive decision to be made by 
the non-participating MS: it may decide not to proceed or to proceed just in order 
to be able to enforce its ‘own’ decision as soon as possible, and with that, the legal 
force of the ne bis in idem principle – it may result in impunity, with a transnational 
enforceability all over Europe. If such a decision would have also been backed by 
political motivations aimed at locally concealing acts (suspected to be) offending 
the EU’s financial interests, the ‘safe-haven’ nature of the Member State’s decision 
would clearly violate the general interests of the Union.15 
 
 
                                                 
15 This research was supported by the project Nr. EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00007 (European Union, co-
financed by the European Social Fund and the budget of Hungary). 
